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Аbstract
The Republic of Serbia is in the final phase of the transition, favorable to the world 
economic trends, in particular the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which was completed by all other countries of Eastern Europe, parts of Asia, South 
America and parts of Africa, where the business activity was predominantly performed 
in the form of various economic entities in which it transposed state or social capital. 
The transition includes comprehensive changes in the country of origin, including 
the privatization of state capital, means, companies that have agricultural land on 
their property that represents good of general interest in Serbia. The buyer of capital 
in the process of privatization has the undoubted interest, for the good engagement 
of the company that it purchases in the privatization process, in order to achieve its 
own economic goal, the maximization of the profit of the company, for the return of 
invested funds, first of all, obtain own earnings, but also payment of the deserved 
indication to all other entities, to whom he directly or indirectly operated with. 
Beside the responsibility for the successful operations of the majority owners of 
capital, the burden of responsibility for the operations of a privatized enterprise 
that owns agricultural land in a certain sense, has a state also, taking into account 
responsibility of the state for performing activity of general interest, primarily 
for the use of goods of general interest and performance of activities of general 
interest the choice of the manner of privatization and the choice of the buyer, as 
well as the permanent control of the performance of the obligations of the buyer 
from the privatization contract.
Key words: transition, good of general interest, privatization of the agrarian 
sector, conditions for privatization, majority shareholder, responsibility for 
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Introduction
Agriculture undoubtedly is a very important activity in the Republic of Serbia, 
which as a branch of activity is given priority in the strategic development plans 
of	the	Republic	of	Serbia,	the	amendments	to	the	Law	on	Agricultural	Land	define	
the concept of agricultural land as a natural resource and a good of general interest 
for the Republic of Serbia. Agricultural land is used for agricultural production 
and can not be used for other purposes, except in cases and under the conditions 
specified	by	the	law,	which	is	a	specialist	law	for	this	matter,	is	otherwise	regulated4. 
In the Republic of Serbia, most of the agricultural land has been privatized in 
accordance with the regulations on privatization, but the majority of contracts 
on these privatizations have been terminated by the state, because they were not 
only	manually	managed	and	manipulated	enterprises.	Everything	was	financed	
by	the	expulsion	of	other	players	from	the	company.	Jobs	are	ruthlessly	cracked,	
many	 workers	 have	 been	 left	 unemployed,	 and	 then	 re-employed	 as	 non-
unionized	with	lower	wages	and	fewer	workers’	benefits,	and	wage	growth	is	
reduced or prevented. Under the pressure of corporations, or in conjunction with 
them, corporate income tax is reduced. All this led to an increase in inequality of 
income, one of the most prominent features of globalization.
Throughout the world, for over a century, there is a permanent tendency to re-
search	and	define	 the	best	 solutions	 for	 regulating	 the	management	and	use	of	
agricultural land and adopting numerous rules on the best agroeconomic practices 
and the principles on which the activity in this sector should be based. These regu-
lations	mostly	focus	on	the	role	of	policy	makers	in	the	country	and	the	majority	of	
existing rules have a national reach.	Legal solutions should in fact encourage and 
encourage active cooperation between the state as owner of agricultural land and 
other persons interested in leasing agricultural land in creating wealth, employ-
ment	and	sustainability	of	financially	healthy	participants	in	agricultural	sector.
In 2004 and 2007, ten and two countries respectively acceded to the EU in 
its enlargement with countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Until 1989, the 
agricultural sector in these countries was regulated by the state and dominated 
by large-scale state farms that cultivated state-owned land or by collective 
farms that typically used land that was still in private ownership on paper 
4 Law	on	Agricultural	Land	(Official	Gazette	of	the	Republic	of	Serbia,	no.	62/06,	65/08	-	
other Law, 41/09, 112/15 and 80/17).
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but over which the landowners did not have any decision rights as to its use 
or allocation. There were only two exceptions, Poland and the former Yugo-
slavian countries, where collectivization largely failed, such that a consider-
able share of agricultural land was already being used by individual farmers 
during the communist era. After 1989, land reforms were introduced and land 
was	restituted	to	the	former	owners	or	distributed	among	the	workers	at	the	
state farms. In addition, farm restructuring resulted in the introduction of hard 
budget constraints. The implementation of farm restructuring and land reform 
processes	was	difficult,	and	in	some	countries	land	reforms	are	still	not	yet	
fully completed (Ciaian, Swinnen, 2006).
In general, the sale of agricultural land is considered superior to land rental 
because 1) land sales transfer full ownership rights to the new users, 2) sales 
are	more	likely	to	increase	access	to	credit,	since	owned	land	can	be	used	as	
collateral, and 3) sales provide optimal incentives for investment by entailing 
the permanent security of rights. In most EU member states, however, the rental 
market	seems	to	be	more	important	than	the	sales	market	and	a	large	share	of	
the agricultural area is rented, although there are substantial variations in the 
shares of rented land. In the old member of European Union, the share of rent-
ed land ranges between 18% in Ireland and 74% in France, while in the new 
member	of	European	Union	it	ranges	from	17%	in	Romania	to	89%	in	Slovakia	
(Ciaian et al., 2012). 
Role of states in privatizing agricultural land
Diverse agricultural extension funding and delivery arrangements have been 
undertaken	 since	 the	 mid-1980s	 by	 governments	 worldwide	 in	 the	 name	
of	 “privatization”.	This	 chapter	 reviews	 these	 actions	 and	 their	 implications	
(Amanor, Farrington, 1991). When agricultural extension is discussed, 
privatization is used in the broadest sense - of introducing or increasing private 
sector participation, which does not necessarily imply a transfer of designated 
state-owned assets to the private sector. In fact, various cost-recoveries, 
commercialization, and other so-called privatization alternatives have been 
adopted to improve agricultural extension. 
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The evolution of public agricultural sector arrived at a worldwide turning point in 
the 1980s, one that represented the end of a major phase in the growth of publicly 
funded	extension	in	both	the	developed	and	developing	world	(Birkhauser	et	al.,	
1988). In developed industrialized countries, which often provide models for ex-
tension service delivery elsewhere, the declining relative importance of agriculture 
for	economic	growth,	the	increasing	education	and	affluence	of	smaller	popula-
tions of rural producers, and the increasing use of externally purchased inputs have 
changed the nature of publicly funded extension services and led to a questioning 
of the means of delivery of extension services by governments (Bunney, Bawcutt, 
1991). In developing countries, where publicly funded extension is often more 
important, there has been considerable questioning of the structure and forms of 
extension delivery.
 
Global Competition
The	consequence	of	the	ratification	of	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	
(GATT) is that countries will have to more actively develop comparative agricul-
tural	advantages	in	the	production	and	marketing	of	food	and	fibre.	Coincidental	
with	a	shift	toward	more	conservative	political	ideologies	and	free-market	eco-
nomics, global developments suggest increased competition in agriculture. While 
countries will focus more on their comparative advantages, they also, in many 
cases, still face national food security concerns and abject rural poverty. 
Reassessment of Public Extension
Against	this	background,	governments	in	recent	times	have	found	that	they	are	less	
able to continue providing all the services previously provided. With costs rising, 
limited resources available, and changes in the prevailing philosophy of the appro-
priate extent of government intervention, governments have been slow to increase 
appropriations for many publicly funded activities. Some functions of government 
have been curtailed, and others have been privatized. Such changes have been 
particularly	significant	in	the	formerly	centrally	managed	economies.	
While the unit cost of extension staff in many countries is low, large staff sizes 
translate	into	large	government	outlays.	As	a	result	of	financial	concerns,	many	
countries have examined alternative structural arrangements, including the feasi-
bility of reducing public sector extension expenditures (with associated staff re-
ductions), changes in tax raising, charges for government extension services, and 
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commercialization and privatization (Howell, 1985). A number of countries have 
moved towards reducing, recovering, or shifting the burden of the costs associat-
ed with provision of public sector agricultural extension, particularly transferring 
“private	good”	functions	to	private	industry.	
Concerns about the costs of extension need to be judged against the economic and 
social returns associated with successful extension. While more research is need-
ed on measuring the economic payoff from investment in public sector extension 
services, available research tends to indicate, in contrast to some current criticisms, 
that extension in many instances provides high rates of return and is, therefore, a 
profitable	public	investment.	In	addition,	not	all	extension	expenditure	can	be	mea-
sured	by	benefits	from	technology	transfer;	the	benefits	of	extension	concerned	
with	human	development	are	difficult	to	quantify	in	the	short	term.
Strategies for change
Public	agricultural	sector,	 facing	criticism	for	 its	cost	and	its	 lack	of	efficiency	
and for not pursuing programs that foster equity, is confronted with a number of 
possibilities for change. 
There has been a trend, perceptible throughout various extension systems undergo-
ing	adjustment,	of	greater	flexibility	and	multiple	partners	in	funding	agricultural	
advisory services (OECD, 1989; Le Gouis, 1991). Le Gouis observed three major 
policies adopted by government and farm organizations regarding privatization of 
extension: 
1. Public	financing	by	the	taxpayer	only	for	the	kinds	of	services	that	are	of	di-
rect concern to the general public 
2. Direct charging for some individual services with direct return (in the form of 
improved income) 
3. Mixed funding shared between public and private professional association 
contributions	for	some	services	where	the	benefits	are	shared.	
A	pervading	development	in	new	forms	of	financial	support	for	extension	is	the	
trend	to	mixed	sources	of	funding,	reflecting	strategies	to	gain	access	to	additional	
sources of funding. In several developing countries, public-private extension coor-
dination is already established. Alternative patterns indicate a fostering of private 
corporate initiative, encouraging cooperative ventures by farmers, coordinating 
public-private extension services, and privatizing the public system. 
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Cost Recovery
Other public extension systems have moved toward cost-recovery approach-
es. Mexico has developed a fee-based system among large-scale farmers in the 
northwest region and plans the development of a similar arrangement among 
small-scale farmers in the south central region. The Agricultural Development 
and Advisory Service (ADAS) in England and Wales, notionally “commercial-
ized,”	operate	on	a	partial	cost-recovery	basis.	Clients	of	ADAS	pay	a	fee	for	ad-
vice which formerly was free of charge. This process of cost recovery, introduced 
in 1987, was directed towards the agency receiving 50 per cent of its income from 
commercial fees by 1993-94. 
Gradual Privatization
In	1990	The	Netherlands	“privatized”	approximately	one-half	of	its	public	ex-
tension	service	by	transferring	field	extension	personnel,	with	initial	government	
financial	support,	to	the	farmer	associations.	The	elements	of	the	extension	ser-
vice	responsible	for	linking	research	and	the	privatized	extension	services,	policy	
preparation,	implementation,	and	promotion	and	regulatory	tasks	remained	under	
the	aegis	of	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture.	The	“privatized”	extension	service	 is	
governed by a board on which farmers’ organizations and the governments are 
equally represented. 
Dutch	 farmers	make	a	partial	 contribution	 to	 the	 cost	 of	 the	new	organization	
through membership subscriptions to farmer associations, as well as through direct 
payment for individual analyses. Farmers will eventually contribute 50 per cent of 
the cost of the service: special services such as individual analyses will be fully 
paid for by the farmer clients. The Dutch government has established new gov-
ernment-funded structures for integrating subject-matter specialists into extension 
teams	to	facilitate	the	transfer	of	information	and	knowledge	and	for	the	provision	
of information on government policy. 
In	order	for	rural	industry	organizations	to	take	a	greater	responsibility	for	technol-
ogy	transfer,	the	Victorian	government	has	proposed	“outsourcing”	for	delivery	of	
future extension programmes. Outsourcing means that the government extension 
agency	will	retain	a	core	pool	of	extension	project	staff	and	“buy	in”	private	sector	
professional	services	with	skills	that	the	agency	considers	unnecessary	to	main-
tain. Agricultural consultants and contract staff will be employed to help deliver 
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services	in	specific	projects	funded	by	rural	industry	and	the	federal	government.	
Such	projects	are	likely	to	be	broad	and	industrywide	and	not	tailored	to	individual	
farm circumstances. 
In	most	cases,	governments	have	not	actually	“privatized”	their	agricultural	exten-
sion services. In its pure sense, privatization implies a full transfer of ownership 
(usually by way of sale) from government to a private entity, with that entity meet-
ing	all	costs	and	receiving	any	profits.	In	the	case	of	extension,	governments	have	
followed a number of distinct pathways such as commercializing the service while 
retaining it as a public agency, shifting public sector delivery services to private 
sector delivery of the service while maintaining oversight and basic funding of de-
livery, or pursuing cost-recovery measures to pay for the service. Thus the phrase 
“privatization	of	agricultural	extension”	generally	is	misleading.	
Other Arrangements
Some countries have never developed public agricultural sector, leaving the func-
tion of agricultural sector to private sector commodity enterprises or industry agen-
cies,	albeit	often	with	some	government	financial	subsidy.	In	France,	while	cham-
bers of agriculture and private sector companies provide extension services, the 
former	are	substantially	supported	financially	by	public	funds.	In	New	Zealand,	
extension services to the dairy industry for many years have been delivered by the 
Dairy	Board	consulting	service,	financed	by	the	dairy	industry.	
In other cases, nongovernmental organizations have been used to supplement 
public sector extension services, especially in the area of rural development. 
This arrangement has certain advantages for increasing extension coverage and 
encouraging farmer participation in technology systems, but it also has certain 
inherent limitations. 
In most countries, private sector companies are already important contributors to 
technology transfer and the advancement of agricultural development through, 
mainly, contract arrangements with farmers. Rightfully, the private sector has 
come	to	be	acknowledged	as	a	major	information	provider	to	both	large	and	small	
farmers	involved	in	monocropping	(Cary,	1993).	The	characteristic	of	“privatized”	
extension systems is a focus on commercial farms. It is salutary to state the obvious 
in relation to decisions regarding private and public provision of extension: when 
extension is delivered privately, it represents a commercial decision; when exten-
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sion is delivered publicly, it is a political or bureaucratic decision. In determining 
whether	to	privatize,	it	is	important,	in	the	first	instance,	to	establish	whether	an	
extension programme is designed to help commercial enterprises or small-scale 
farming and rural development.
Alternative funding and delivery
Diverse	directions	have	been	taken	and	multiple	means	of	payment	(public	and	
private)	have	emerged	as	governments	have	opted	 for	alternative	financial	and	
delivery arrangements to pay for and deliver public sector agricultural extension 
services. Extension provision is often multi-institutional and organized in ways 
that are not necessarily independent. 
Where the public sector provides extension, the alternative funding arrangements 
include: 
1. General tax-based public funding for agriculture, including funding of agri-
cultural extension services, that is, the traditional public sector mode of fund-
ing extension 
2. Commodity tax-based public funding	(through	cess	or	parafiscal	tax),	for	ex-
ample on an agricultural commodity such as coffee, as in El Salvador 
3. Fee-based public funding, in which fees are charged, usually to large farmers 
for extension service, for instance in Mexico’s grainrich northern region 
4. Contract-based commercialisation of public services, whereby contract-based 
arrangements are made between farmer and public sector extension services, 
as in New Zealand
Where the private sector provides extension, the alternative funding arrangements 
include: 
1. Government revenue-based vouchers, provided to farmers who then contract 
with private sector agents for extension information provision, as in Chile 
2. Public credit revenue-based coupon schemes attached to agriculture loans, 
obligating the farmer-borrower to use a percentage of the loan for extension 
advising purposes 
3. Membership and fee-based, including commodity tax-based funding, where-
by farmers pay member ship and service fees, and the private organization 
(e.g., a chamber of agriculture) also receives funds through a public cess or 
parafiscal	 tax	 charged	 on	 agricultural	 commodities,	 which	 funds	 are	 then	
transferred to the private sector organization; the private sector then provides 
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the	extension	services	-	although	public	sector	officials	generally	sit	on	the	
chamber’s governing board 
4. Membership fee plus commercial sponsorship by groups of input suppliers, 
where farmer groups are provided nonadvisory, educational extension ser-
vices by a consortium of privately employed agricultural consultants with 
partial	financial	support	from	rural	sector	commercial	sponsors	-	such	groups	
can operate on a large scale, with coordinated extension objectives3 
5. Privatization, whereby provision and, eventually, agent salary payments are 
shifted to a farmers’ association or other private entity.
The Privatization Debate
There	are	two	themes	in	the	broader	privatization	debate:	first,	a	“political	econ-
omy”	consideration	of	the	role	and	size	of	government	in	an	economy,	which	
focusses	on	whether	or	not	there	is	a	failure	of	private	markets;	and,	secondly,	
an expressed need to reduce government outlays. While many reassessments of 
publicly	funded	extension	have	reflected	the	second	theme,	it	is	worth	consid-
ering the rationale for public versus private activity in an economy. 
In	mixed	 economies,	 the	 prevailing	 economic	 justification	 for	 government	 in-
volvement	in	an	activity	such	as	agricultural	extension	is	market	failure,	whereby	
the	market	mechanism	alone	cannot	perform	all	economic	functions	for	appropri-
ate	resource	allocation.	Market	failure	may	arise	because	some	goods	or	services	
are	public	goods	(such	as	publicly	funded	agricultural	research	knowledge)	which	
can be consumed in a nonrival fashion by all members of society without any 
individual’s consumption reducing the amount available for other individuals. Be-
cause	the	benefit	of	providing	such	goods	cannot	be	appropriated	by	individuals,	
individuals generally will not provide such goods in a society even though there 
may	be	significant	gains	for	producers	and	consumers.	Some	extension	activities	
are	clearly	concerned	with	public	goods	subject	to	market	failure.	Other	activities	
(such	as	individually	tailored	advice)	confer	appropriable	private	benefits	which	
could	be	adequately	supplied	by	private	markets.	
Private	goods	sometimes	are	subject	to	market	failure,	whereby	the	operation	of	
private	markets	does	not	provide	certain	services	at	a	socially	optimal	 level	or	
where	external	costs	or	benefits	are	accrued	by	others	 rather	 than	 the	provider	
of	 the	goods.	Market	failure	also	may	arise	when	current	generations	place	in-
sufficient	value	on	preservation	of	resources	for	future	generations.	These	latter	
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circumstances are particularly characteristic of land and water degradation. Pub-
licly	funded	conservation	extension	is	often	directed	to	overcoming	such	market	
failures	(Cary,	Wilkinson,	1992).	
Government	support	for	the	provision	of	extension	services	may	reflect	that	such	
services would be inadequately provided without intervention or, for reasons of 
equity, because services would not be available to the extent thought socially de-
sirable.	Some	situations	 for	agricultural	extension	clearly	 reflect	private	goods;	
other situations clearly are characterized as public goods. There is a lot of fuzzy 
ground in the middle where it is not particularly clear that an extension activity is 
conferring a public or private good. In such situations, the extent of publicly fund-
ed	extension	is	likely	to	be	determined	by	the	political	influence	brought	to	bear	by	
relevant interest groups (Cary, 1993). 
The philosophical thrust of the general privatization debate has centred, on the 
one	hand,	on	whether	certain	government	activities	could	be	performed	more	effi-
ciently	by	private	agencies	operating	in	private	markets	and,	on	the	other	hand,	on	
whether inequities may arise because not all individuals have access to resources 
to purchase privately supplied services. 
The Debate with Respect to Extension
While much of the public policy debate related to extension has focused on so-
called privatization or commercialization as means of reducing government out-
lays, other aspects need consideration. The commercialization experience of Ag-
riculture	New	Zealand	(Walker,	1993),	while	not	without	its	problems,	provides	
examples of some of the arguments for commercialization. Commercialization is 
perceived	to	have	had	a	positive	effect	on	moving	“beyond	the	farm	gate”	into	an	
involvement of the extension staff in the entire production-processing-transport-
ing-marketing	chain.	There	also	has	been	the	shift	in	focus	to	a	client	orientation	
and a concern to identify and produce results rather than simply to engage in ac-
tivities. 
In economically developed countries with a predominance of larger-scale com-
mercial farming, increasingly the technologies of modem, industrialized farming 
are being developed by nongovernment industrial institutions; such technologies 
are	appropriable	for	private	marketing	and	generally	have	little	need	for	govern-
ment	extension.	In	developed	economies,	it	is	more	difficult	to	argue	for	publicly	
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funded extension for rural industries containing fewer producers who are closely 
linked	and	integrated	with	research	systems.	
The	weaknesses	of	privatization	are	more	apparent	in	the	context	of	developing	
countries, where the situation may be quite different. For instance in African ag-
riculture, funding by user fees may not be viable. An erroneous assumption may 
be that recipients of government services are generally being subsidized by the 
government (Leonard, 1985). Тhis is far from the case with African agricultural 
producers, who instead are usually subsidizing the rest of society. The most ob-
vious	shortcoming	may	be	the	difficulty	of	collecting	user	fees	and	establishing	
cost-accounting procedures to set charges at appropriate levels. The subsistence 
nature of most African farming leads to a much stronger case for state intervention 
in support of food production than in developed countries. 
Institutional Considerations
The search for appropriate institutional arrangements for different situations echoes 
the larger debate currently under way on creative use of the private sector for sup-
planting or supplementing public services. Privatization represents one position in 
the debate over how public functions should be organized. Wise has observed that 
“privatization... is not necessarily a simplifying strategy... the responsibilities of 
public	organizations	does	not	disappear,	they	merely	change.”	The	primary	issue	
may not be whether a certain function should be entrusted to public or private orga-
nizations,	but,	rather,	what	configuration	of	organizations,	both	public	and	private,	is	
needed and what arrangements between them provide the most effective outcomes. 
In some instances, central government bureaucracies are seen as unresponsive and 
inefficient,	and	the	diffusion	of	responsibility	arises	out	of	a	concern	that	the	public	
sector should be reduced in size. In other cases, however, the emphasis is less on 
reducing the size of the public sector and more on sharing authority among different 
units. The question of what role the government should play within an increasingly 
complex institutional arena is itself complex and not one to which, necessarily, there 
are simple answers (Wise, 1990). 
Summary of Rationales
The rationale for private sector provision of agricultural extension services is gen-
erally	based	on	an	expectation	of	increased	efficiency	with	the	operation	of	private	
markets	and	with	the	resulting	efficiencies	contributing	to	the	growth	of	a	coun-
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try’s GNP. In contrast, the rationale for public provision of agricultural extension 
services is based on the following points: (1) much agricultural information is a 
public	good;	(2)	only	government	extension	services	are	likely	to	promote	concern	
for natural resources management; (3) public sector extension may enhance the 
education	of	farmers	who	often	lack	adequate	access	to	educational	institutions;	
(4)	the	public	service	often	provides	information	that	reduces	risk	to	farmers;	(5)	
the service may provide information that reduces transaction costs; and (6) an ex-
tension service may be concerned with community health issues related to possible 
human	hazards	such	as	accidents	and	poisonings	linked	to	agricultural	chemicals.	
The argument for privatization is based upon: 
-	 More	efficient	delivery	of	services
-	 Lowered government expenditures
-	 Higher quality of services
Privatization may have some attendant disadvantages because of unequal access to 
resources	and	because	of	a	diversity	of	“agencies”	and	the	associated	difficulty	of	
coordinating external groups and other government departments. Private delivery 
agents will be less responsive to government policy direction, and there may be 
linkage	problems	with	public	applied	research	organizations.	
While the process of information transfer amongst farmers traditionally has been 
characterized by a cooperative, free exchange of information, industrial informa-
tion traditionally has been a private good characterized by patent rights, process 
licensing,	the	use	of	paid	consultants,	and	differentiated	production	and	marketing	
processes. In developed economies with commercialized agriculture sectors, many 
of these features of industrial information transfer are becoming more common in 
agriculture. The trend to privatization will be stronger the more such circumstanc-
es exist. The range of different circumstances prevailing in agricultural extension 
worldwide suggests that a wide variety of approaches should prevail.
Implications of extension privatization
In general, a more commercialized approach broadens the focus of extension per-
sonnel	and	makes	an	extension	service	more	responsive	to	client	needs	and	chang-
ing economic and social conditions. But other immediate implications of privatiza-
tion	appear	to	include	(1)	the	tendency	toward	a	reduction	of	linkages	both	among	
organizations and among farmers in the exchange of agricultural and other relevant 
information; (2) the tendency to enhance large-scale farm enterprise to the detriment 
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of small-scale farming; (3) the diminishing emphasis on public-good information 
and	the	advancement	of	knowledge	as	a	saleable	commodity;	and	(4)	the	trend	to-
ward agricultural development services that cater primarily to large-scale farming. 
The Netherlands’ experience in moving to a partially privatized system highlights 
some of the implications for agricultural extension, particularly in developed coun-
tries. The Netherlands’ approach reduced government outlays as well as the govern-
ment	agency	role	conflict	between	concern	for	farmers’	interests	and	the	implemen-
tation of increasingly stringent environmental policies. With farmers paying for an 
increasing	share	of	the	extension	services,	their	representatives	have	more	influence	
on	the	direction	of	the	extension	service.	New	organizational	structures	and	linkag-
es	have	had	to	be	established	to	link	the	“privatized”	and	private	extension	services	
with the research institutes, experiment stations, and regional experiment farms. 
Consequent upon, or in parallel with, the changed Dutch arrangements, other 
changes	have	 taken	place	 in	 the	Netherlands’	extension	system.	There	 is	some	
evidence, at least for the vegetable greenhouse sector, that the high level of coop-
eration among extension information organizations in both the public and private 
sectors no longer exists (Huang, 1992). The more commercial orientation of the 
system	appears	to	be	creating	tensions	between	extension	workers	and	their	clients	
in	a	less	“open”	knowledge	and	information	system,	with	farmers	who	used	to	
share information during study-group meetings now being more reluctant to do so. 
Those extension services that have adopted a commercialization or privatization 
strategy most vigorously have traditionally employed an advisory approach to ex-
tension	delivery.	The	advice	given	is	more	likely	to	be	a	private	good.	As	well,	
the	extension	advisers	are	more	likely	to	be	able	to	adapt	to	providing	services	
commercially.	However,	some	staff	will	not	make	such	a	transition	easily,	new	
commercial	skills	will	be	required	by	newly	commercialized	advisers,	and	the	dy-
namics of any change will have to be planned carefully. Le Gouis (1991) has noted 
that	government	“commercial”	fees	should	be	set	at	the	market	rate	so	as	not	to	
compete unfairly with existing private consultants. 
Institutional Implications
The new developments highlight greater institutional pluralism. Extension, inter-
preted	broadly,	now	is	often	a	mixed	system	or	a	“complex”	where	services	are	
provided by private and public sector entities. The larger context in which a mix of 
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public and private services operates presents a new challenge with new potential 
roles and responsibilities for the public sector. A major premise of this chapter is 
that	policy	makers	must	consider	the	entire	agricultural	extension	complex	when	
planning	to	allocate	funds	or	seeking	alternative	funding	arrangements	for	the	pub-
lic sector. 
State interest
Responsible	business	of	companies	is	one	of	the	key	solutions	for	achieving	
sustainable development, it is the right balance between economic interests, 
as the main driver of development and the interests of the society as a whole. 
According	to	the	well-known	principles	of	corporate	governance,	adopted	in	
most countries of the world, the achievement of the company’s target function 
-	maximization	of	profit,	that	is,	company	value	is	the	imperative	of	every	com-
pany. The imperative of the corporation and its administration is a constant in-
crease	in	profit,	as	it	maintains	a	safe	life	of	the	corporation.	Everywhere	in	the	
world companies perform a very important function for every state and society 
as	a	whole,	they	have	a	great	influence	on	the	community,	so	they	have	an	obli-
gation to act in the general social interest, respecting the good rules of socially 
responsible	business.	Jobs	are	ruthlessly	cracked,	many	workers	have	been	left	
unemployed, and then re-employed as non-unionized with lower wages and 
fewer	workers’	benefits,	and	wage	growth	is	reduced	or	prevented.	Under	the	
pressure of corporations, or in conjunction with them, corporate income tax 
is reduced. All this led to an increase in inequality of income, one of the most 
prominent features of globalization. 
The concept of corporate social responsibility was created primarily on the ba-
sis	of	voluntarism,	which	later	turned	into	a	field	of	legal	obligation	somewhat.	
At the same time, there exist the notion that, being socially responsible does not 
only	mean	fulfilling	legal	orders,	but	also	to	go	“beyond”	that	companies	are	
obliged, for example, increased investment in protection of human rights from 
the legally prescribed minimum of protection, greater protection of consumers 
from the legal minimum protection, higher investments in environmental pro-
tection,	greater	protection	of	other	stakeholders	besides	the	owner	(employees,	
creditors, administration, local community, state). This approach also has its 
direct	starting	point	in	increasing	the	productivity,	profit	and	competitiveness	
of the company. In this way, the demands of the state regarding the company’s 
commitment to social responsibility, from the idea that it was originally con-
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ceived, applies only to the largest multinational corporations, extended to small 
and medium-sized enterprises.
In support of the concept of social responsibility, the reasons for ethics and the 
reasons	for	marketing	point	out,	but	because	both	have	their	own	economic	ex-
pression	in	increasing	profits.	It	is	considered	to	be	a	kind	of	investment,	so-called,	
socially responsible investment, not the cost so that it has the impression that, as 
such, they are not enough. Namely, it is about the real condition without which 
there is no sustainable development of the company in the long run, nor the devel-
opment and stability of the society and each individual state.
Conclusion
This chapter concludes with a recommendation for consideration of the various 
“privatization”	arrangements	mentioned	herein,	but	also	stresses	the	importance	
of individual country situational analysis and independent political and technical 
determinations, not the use of implantation or formulas, in developing funding and 
delivery	arrangements	to	provide	for	agricultural	extension.	The	diverse	financial	
arrangements adopted in the last two decades by governments worldwide to fund 
agricultural extension services provide a valuable menu of options for consider-
ation	by	other	countries	confronting	the	“privatizing”	of	public	sector	services.	
Still, several countries have resisted the trend toward privatization of agricultural 
sector, concerned perhaps by the implications reviewed in this chapter. In both 
developed and developing countries, renewed debate and experimentation around 
extension is certainly needed, but not only around allocation decisions and how 
best to develop cooperative arrangements with the private sector. In most coun-
tries,	government-funded	extension	is	likely	to	focus	its	activities	more	selective-
ly	on	public-good	activities	which	exist	and	on	areas	where	the	marketplace	is	
unlikely	to	provide	services	at	a	socially	optimal	level.	Such	areas	will	include	
“broad”	rather	than	“specific”	technology	transfer,	dissemination	of	environmental	
and resource technology, and human resource development. 
The move in the public sector toward privatization and efforts to decentralize gov-
ernment	functions	can	serve	to	highlight	the	continuing	and	key	role	of	the	pub-
lic sector and focus the operative question on its responsibility as a coordinating 
agent. Its roles of regulation and providing service for priority audiences unserved 
by the private sector will be undiminished.
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